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تفاصيل

العنوان
Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
مرجع
533761
Board DOC ID
WP/07/91
التاريخ
April 1 2007
مستوى الوصف
item
مادة
Electronic Records
Language
English
الموضوع
Central banks, Governance, Executive Board Document (Policy), IMF Working Papers (WP)
المنشيء
Gauti Eggertsson, Eric Le Borgne, Fiscal Affairs Department
External document
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متصفح هرمي

Ref:865759 | Level:
- Executive Board Documents
  Ref:169321 | Level:
  [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 61
  - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:337593 | Level:سلاسل
    [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 28
    
    2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:سلاسل-فرعية
    [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 306
    
    Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:وعاء

Ref:865790 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:سلاسل
  [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 28
  - 2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:سلاسل-فرعية
    [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 306
    
    Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:وعاء

Ref:865850 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:سلاسل
  [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 28
  - 2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:سلاسل-فرعية
    [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 306
    
    Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:وعاء

Ref:865910 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:سلاسل
  [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 28
  - 2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:سلاسل-فرعية
    [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 306
    
    Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:وعاء

Ref:867487 | Level:
- 2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:سلاسل-فرعية
  [ar-SA]contains[ar-SA] 306
  - Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:وعاء