[ChangeLanguage]

Archives Catalog

Main content

Details

Titel
Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
Signatur
533761
Board DOC ID
WP/07/91
Datum
April 1 2007
Verzeichnungsstufe
item
Material
Electronic Records
Language
English
Schlagwort
Central banks, Governance, Executive Board Document (Policy), IMF Working Papers (WP)
Hersteller
Gauti Eggertsson, Eric Le Borgne, Fiscal Affairs Department
External document
Download PDF

Hierarchie-Browser

Ref:865759 | Level:
- Executive Board Documents
  Ref:169321 | Level:
  enthält 61
  - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:337593 | Level:Serie, Aktengruppe
    enthält 28
    
    2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:Untergruppe
    enthält 306
    
    Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:Einzelstück, Einheit

Ref:865790 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:Serie, Aktengruppe
  enthält 28
  - 2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:Untergruppe
    enthält 306
    
    Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:Einzelstück, Einheit

Ref:865850 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:Serie, Aktengruppe
  enthält 28
  - 2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:Untergruppe
    enthält 306
    
    Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:Einzelstück, Einheit

Ref:865910 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:Serie, Aktengruppe
  enthält 28
  - 2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:Untergruppe
    enthält 306
    
    Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:Einzelstück, Einheit

Ref:867487 | Level:
- 2007 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:529910 | Date(s):2007 | Level:Untergruppe
  enthält 306
  - Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
    Ref:533761 | Date(s):April 1 2007 | Level:Einzelstück, Einheit